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LIABILITY OF AUTOMOBILE DRIVERS
TO GRATUITOUS PASSENGERS UNDER THE WISCONSIN LAW
HARRY V. MEISSNER

WITH

the advent of the automobile, creating as it did a new peril

in the use of highways,' courts were soon required to judicially
determine the rights and liabilities of gratuitous passengers in such
motor driven vehicles. The courts were influenced o'n the one hand by
a desire to penalize careless driving,2 and on the other by a realization that too severe a standard of care imposed upon the drivers of
automobiles might result in a generous open-hearted person who invited a guest to take a ride in his car being found liable in damages to
such guest in an amount greater than the cost of the car itself.3 That

ILauson v.

Fond du Lac, 141 Wis. 57, 123 N.W. 629 (1909).
2"Notwithstanding the automobile has won the judicial encomium of being a
harmless instrumentality, the fact remains that its toll of life and limb far
exceeds that of any other human agency. An automobile moving at an ordinary speed requires the constant attention of the driver if it is not to become
a menace to the safety of its occupants as well as pedestrians. The locomotive
engineer may contemplate the landscape with comparative assurance that his
train will not run into the ditch, but the driver of a car may take but momentary glances at his surroundings if he would keep his car upon the highway
and preserve the security of its occupants." Sommerfield v. Flury, 198 Wis.
163, 223 N.W. 408 (1929).
3
"There are many who cannot afford to own an automobile. There are few
who do not covet the comfort, pleasure, and recreation afforded thereby. It is
an act of kindness and consideration for the owner of a car to lend its comfort and pleasure through an invitation extended to his less fortunate neighbor
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Wisconsin, as well as other commonwealths, has experienced some
difficulty in establishing a standard of liability for automobile drivers
that adequately meets the problem involved will probably be apparent
from this summary of the rights and liabilities of gratuitous automobile passengers under the rules of law presently obtaining in the
state of Wisconsin.
IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE THEORY

Under the early Wisconsin rule one who voluntarily became a
passenger in a conveyance thereby so far identified himself with the
driver that he could not recover for an injury negligently inflicted by
4
a third person, if the driver's negligence was a contributing cause.
Thus in an early case, where the plaintiff was injured by the overturning of a livery carriage, the trial court instructed the jury, "* * *
So, if you find conclusively to your minds contributory negligence on
the part of Ternes, the driver, then the plaintiff cannot recover." Discussing this charge, the then Chief Justice, Edward G. Ryan, said,
"One voluntarily in a private conveyance voluntarily trusts his personal
safety in the conveyance to the person in control of it. Voluntary entrance into a private conveyance adopts the conveyance for the time
being as one's own, and assumes the risk of the skill and care of the
person guiding it. Pro hac vice, the master of a private yacht or the
driver of a private carriage is accepted as agent by every person voluntarily committing himself to it."' Upon the same occasion, commenting
upon the relationship of guest and host, the court remarks, "A woman
may and should refuse to ride with a man, if she dislikes or distrusts
the man, or his horse, or his carriage. But, if she voluntarily accepts
his invitation to ride, the man may, indeed, become liable to her for
gross negligence; but as to third persons, the man is her agent to drive
her-she takes man and horse and carriage for the jaunt, for better,
for worse."
The theory underlying the imputed negligence doctrine was that
when the plaintiff entered the driver's conveyance to ride with him,
he made such conveyance for the time being his own, the negligence
of the driver being imputed to such passenger.6 This rule was reiterated
for a ride in the country to join a picnic party, or to enjoy an evening at the
theater in a nearby city. This is a species of hospitality which should be encouraged rather than discouraged, and the law should not couple with this
friendly act a duty which makes its exercise an unreasonable hazard." O'Shea
v. Lavoy, 175 Wis. 456, 185 N.W. 525 (1921).
4That negligence on the part of the driver would preclude recovery by a passenger seemed assumed as early as Houfe v. Fulton, 29 Wis. 296 (1871).
5Prideauxv. City of Mineral Point, 43 Wis. 513 (1878).
6 Ritger v. City of Milwaukee, 99 Wis. 190, 74 N.W. 815 (1898).
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by the Wisconsin Supreme Court upon many occasions.7 Thus the
court in one case says, "* * * if he can see objects but ten feet ahead,

while he cannot stop his car in less than twenty feet, is he using
ordinary care? If not, and injury results from his negligent act, neither
he nor his passengers, if the conveyance be a private one, can recover
damages for such injury."8 The doctrine of imputed negligence was
not applied to public conveyances. 9 As to private conveyances, however, such rule seemed permanently established in the law of Wisconsin, the court having said that, if any change were to be made, it was
1
for the legislature to do so.Y
IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE DOCTRINE OVERRULED
As late as Puhr v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co." the Wisconsin Su-

preme court is found remarking, "It is well established in this state
that the negligence of the driver of a private conveyance is imputed to
the persons voluntarily riding with him." This condition of well estab2
lished permanence did not last much longer. For in Reiter v. Grober'
the Wisconsin Supreme Court, "the more readily because no litigant
before the court suffers by reason of the repudiation of the doctrine,"
overruled the imputed negligence rule, terming such doctrine, "the
doctrine now to be laid to rest after a vigorous life of fifty years."
In the case then under consideration, action was brought for injuries
sustained by plaintiff in being run over by an automobile in which
party defendant was a passenger. The theory of the plaintiff's case,
i.e., that the occupant was an agent of the driver and as such liable
to third persons for the negligence of the driver was an ingenious but
transparently unsound attempt to extend the imputed negligence theory
to the extent of making occupants of automobiles insurers of third persons against the negligence of the driver.
The court not only declined to so extend the holding in Prideauxv.
7 Otis v. Janesville, 47

Wis. 422, 2 N.W. 783 (1879) ; Johnson v. Superior R.T.R.
Co., 91 Wis. 233, 64 N.W. 753 (1895) ; Lockwood v. The Belle City Street R.
Co., 92 Wis. 97, 65 N.W. 866 (1896) ; Olson v. The Town of Luck, 103 Wis.
33, 79 N.W. 29 (1899) ; Hains v. Johnson, 154 Wis. 648, 143 N.W. 653 (1913) ;
Sommerfield v. Chicago M. & St. P. R. Co., 155 Wis. 102, 143 N.W. 1032
(1913) ; Kuchler v. Milwaukee E.R. Co., 157 Wis. 107, 146 N.W. 1133 (1914);
Puhr v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 171 Wis. 154, 176 N.W. 767 (1920).
8 Lauson v. Fond du Lac, supra.
9Landry v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 152 Wis. 379, 140 N.W. 75 (1913) ; Ellis v.
C. & N. W. R. Co. 167 Wis. 392, 167 N.W. 1048 (1918) ; Bakula v. Schwab,
167 Wis. 546, 168 N.W. 378 (1918).
10 Lightfoot v. Winnebago Traction Co., 123 Wis. 479, 102 N.W. 30 (1905).
11 171 Wis. 154, 176 N.W. 767 (1920).
12173 Wis. 493, 181 N.W. 739 (1921).
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City of MineralPoint, but also expressly overruled such holding, insofar as it imputed the negligence of the driver of a private vehicle
to an occupant therein. The court did not discuss "when and under
what circumstances the occupant may be guilty of contributory negligence or engaged in a joint undertaking with the driver or stand in
such relation to him that the negligence of the driver may be imputed
to him." The practical effect of the decision was that henceforth it
would be necessary to determine the question of the negligence of the
13
occupant of an automobile as a separate and independent question.
The above holding did not, however, abrogate the general rule that
a passenger in an automobile is required to use the same care for his
safety that a reasonably careful person would exercise under the same
or similar circumstances. 14 Therefore, in addition to more precisely defining the duty devolving upon the driver of a motor vehicle, 5 the
courts have defined and developed certain duties and responsibilities
devolving upon guests in automobiles. For the most part such duties
are not imposed upon passengers for hire in "jitneys," busses, or taxicabs.2

6

13Mitchell v. Raymond, 181 Wis. 591, 195 N.W. 855 (1923).

24Howe v. Corey, 172 Wis. 537, 179 N.W. 791 (1920); see also Wuppler v.
Schenck, 178 Wis. 632, 190 N.W. 555 (1922).
15The driver of an automobile on a public highway owes to a gratuitous guest
the duty of exercising ordinary care not to increase the danger to the guest
which the latter assumes on entering the car, or to create a new danger.
Waters v. Markham, 204 Wis. 332, 235 N.W. 797 (1931); Poneitowicki v.
Harres, 200 Wis. 504, 228 N.W. 126 (1930) ; Page v. Page, 199 Wis. 641, 227
N.W. 233 (1929). However, as far as lookout and inattention are concerned,
as distinguished from inexperience or lack of skill possessed by the driver.
the host owes the same degree of care to his guest as he owes to others.
Heims v. Bihn, 200 Wis. 321, 228 N.W. 599 (1930). "There are certain duties
imposed upon the drivers of automobiles, the abilities to perform which do
not depend upon experience or acquired skill. Among these is the duty to
maintain a reasonable speed, obey the law of the road, keep a proper lookout,
etc. These are duties which are required to be observed for the safety of
everyone-those within as well as those without the automobile-and failure
to perform them may result in liability in the absence of acquiescence or contributory negligence on the part of the guest." Poneitowicki v. Harres, supra.
16 When one hires a taxicab he contracts for safe transportation to his destination; he has every right to expect that the cab is manned by a skilled and
competent driver; therefore, under ordinary circumstances, he is not required
to warn the driver nor maintain a lookout. Scales v. Boynton Cab Co., 198 Wis.
293, 223 N.W. 836 (1929). "The duty imposed on common carriers is to provide for the safety of passengers and to exercise the highest degree of care reasonably to be expected from human nature and foresight in view of the character of the conveyance adopted and consistent with the practical operation of
the business." McCaffery v. Automobile Liability Co., Limited Mutual, 176
Wis. 230, 186 N.W. 585 (1922). The carrier must meet "the standard of per-
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The following discussion is an attempt to summarize the duties and
responsibilities devolving upon gratuitous automobile passengers under
the Wisconsin Supreme Court decisions. An attempt will also be made
to indicate the importance and trace the development of the "assumption of risk" doctrine, the rule that one assumes the consequences of
acts to which he knowingly consented and which he voluntarily per17
mitted.
DuTY OF MAINTAINING A LOOKOUT

The decisions of the Wisconsin Supreme Court clearly indicate
that the guest in an automobile must maintain some sort of lookout.
What will be held to be a sufficient lookout varies with the facts and
circumstances of each particular case. "It is well settled that a guest
in an automobile must give some heed to his or her own safety, and
that ordinary care requires that he or she should maintain a proper
lookout * * *. What constitutes a proper lookout depends upon cir-

cumstances. While the circumstances may be so clear that a failure to
keep a proper lookout may be declared as a matter of law, it is generally a jury question * * *.A guest is not held to the same degree
of care in this respect that is required of the driver, and one sitting on
the back seat is held to a less degree of care than one sitting on the
front seat.""'
Thus, while constant attention is not always required, 19 a total
sons generally, in the same business under the same circumstances." Ormond
v. Wisconsin Power & Light Co., 194 Wis. 305, 216 N.W. 489 (1927). See also
Anderson v. Yellow Cab Co., 179 Wis. 307, 191 N.W. 748 (1923); Carson v.
Green Cab Co., 186 Wis. 566, 203 N.W. 394 (1925); Dibbert v. Metropolitan
Inv. Co., 158 Wis. 69, 147 N.W. 3 (1914); Ferguson v. Truax, 132 Wis. 478,
110 N.W. 395, 111 N.W. 657, 112 N.W. 513 (1907); Oberndorfer v. Pabst, 100
Wis. 505, 73 N.W. 338 (1898) ; Merton v. Mich. Central R. Co., 150 Wis. 540,
137 N.W. 767 (1912).
.7As to the distinction between assumption of risk and contributory negligence
as defenses to actions brought by guests against hosts see Note 18 Iowa Law
Rev. 358 (1933); in Wisconsin it has been said, "To the lay mind at least
the term 'assumption of risk' is distinguished from that of 'contributory negligence' because contributory negligence involves fault and assumption of risk
does not." Biersach v. Wechselberg, 206 Wis. 113, 238 N.W. 905 (1931). As
to whether assumption of risk should come under the Comparative Negligence Law, sec. 331.045, Wis. Stats., see Richard V. Campbell, "Wisconsin's
Comparative Negligence Law," 7 Wis. Law Rev. 223 at 235-241 (1932).
isKrause v. Hall, 195 Wis. 565, 217 N.W. 290 (1928). In this case the court refused to hold the passenger guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of
law, although she failed to discover the presence of a train, because the reason her vision was obscured was that she was afflicted with asthma and held
her coat collar over her face to protect her lungs.
'19A wife sitting in the rear seat when her husband is driving a car over a
road apparently in good condition is not bound to pay constant attention to
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failure to observe the road and probable dangers would, if injury
suffered was attributable thereto, bar recovery.20 In accidents occurring
at railroad crossings, the courts, agreeing that the man "must stop for
the train, not the train stop for him,"' 21 have held that a sixteen year

old boy who while a guest in an automobile failed to warn the host of
an approaching train while the car was still thirty feet from the track
and the car could have been stopped in two feet was guilty of contributory negligence.2 2 And, although there are cases implying that whether
the passenger's failure to look constitutes contributory negligence is a
jury question, 23 it has been said that if the rule is to be more than a
"mere gesture," where the failure to maintain a lookout is clear, con24
tributory negligence will be found as a matter of law.
GUEST'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE CAR AND ITS DRIVER

Where the owner of an automobile who was about to make a pleasure trip, fully believing in the sufficiency of the car to make such trip
with safety to the occupants, invited his father-in-law to ride with him
and by reason of the giving away of a defective spring the father-inlaw sustained an injury, no recovery was allowed the father-in-law
the management of the car or to keep a constant lookout for imperfections in
the road. Brubaker v. Iowa County, 174 Wis. 574, 183 N.W. 690 (1921).
20 Howe v. Corey, supra; fact that passenger was asleep did not preclude recovery if there was no causal connection between the collision and such conduct.
Schmidt v. Leuthener, 199 Wis. 567, 227 N.W. 17 (1929). Under the Comparative Negligence Law, supra, recovery of course would merely be cut down
depending on the proportion which the guest's contributory negligence bore
to the total negligence.
21 Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 48 Sup. Ct. 24, 72 L.Ed.
167 (1927). "The condemned man goes to the gallows with certain trepidation,
yet he goes to no more certain death than does he who places himself in front
of an onrushing train. Since a train may be coming at any moment, the entrance upon a railroad track is or should be a matter of genuine solicitude."
Waitkus v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 204 Wis. 566, 236 N.W. 531 (1931).
22 Crane v. Weber, (Wis., 1933) 247 N.W. 882. In this case the court remarks,
"Had he not looked at all for the approach of the train, after seeing the
wigwag in operation, we would have to say, under the rule of the Waitkus
case, supra, that he was guilty of negligence as a matter of law, if the duty
to look is obligatory or to be of any force or effect. It is useless to look if
one is not to heed what he sees and give warning when he sees a train so
near that a collision is imminent if the automobile is not stopped."
23 Tomberlin v. C. St. P. M. & 0. R. Co., 208 Wis. 30, 242 N.W. 677, 243 N.W.
208 (1932); reaffirmed in Paine v. C. M. St. P. Ry. Co., 208 Wis. 423, 243
N.W. 405 (1932). Ordinarily the verdict of jury will not be disturbed, where

24

jury might have thought passenger should have seen danger had he been observing the road. Glick v. Baer, 186 Wis. 268, 201 N.W. 752 (1925).
"It is futile to lay down a rule and then absolve performance of it in cases
where juries plainly disregard it." Crane v. Weber, supra; Rock v. Sarazen,
209 Wis. 126, 244 N.W. 577 (1932).
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for he took the car as he found it, attended by the same measure of
security enjoyed by the owner and the other members of his family,
and he was entitled to no more. 25 When a person enters a car, he
accepts it in its existing condition except as to latent defects known to
the driver. 26 Thus, passengers are bound by knowledge of some defect
in the car such as poor brakes.2 7 Upon the driver there is placed the
duty of warning the guest as to any latent or concealed defect in the
nature of a trap, known to him but unknown to the guest, and which
the host believes dangerous and which he realizes involves an unreasonable risk to his guest. Thus in the case of J~atersv. Markham, 2s where
liability was sought to be predicated upon defective tires, the court
said, "The issues raised on such claim were, whether the deceased (the
driver) knew that his tires were in a defective condition and realized,
or should have realized, that the tires in the condition they were in
involved an unreasonable risk to the plaintiff; whether the defective
condition of the tires was so concealed or hidden as not to be reasonably obvious or patent to the plaintiff; whether the defective condition
of the tires and the risk involved therein were unknown to the plaintiff; and whether the deceased failed to warn the plaintiff as to the
''
defective condition of the tires and the risk involved therein. 29
A guest assumes the dangers incident to the skill, competence, and
experience of the driver; this is true whether such degree of skill or
amount of experience is known or unknown to the guest.30 The fundamental basis for the exemption of a host from liability for injury sustained by a guest through lack of skill or experience is that the host
"In this case the damage resulted from a defective spring on the automobile.
Negligent operation thereof is not claimed. We can see no difference between
an invitation extended by a person to dine with him and an invitation extended
to ride with him * * * the guest accepts the premises of his host as he finds
them, subject only to the limitation that the licensor must not set a trap or be
guilty of active negligence which contributed to the injury. * * * The guest
has not a right to a greater security than that enjoyed by the host or other
members of his family. The host simply places the premises which he has to
offer at the disposal and enjoyment of his guest upon equal terms of security."
O'Shea v. Lavoy, 175 Wis. 456, 185 N.W. 525 (1921). However, proceeding
for some distance with a broken spring by a driver who knew that something
was wrong with his car which materially interfered with its steering and control held to be negligence. Sweet v. Underwriters"Casualty Co., 206 Wis. 447,
240 N.W. 199 (1932).
26 Poneitowicki v. Harres,200 Wis. 504, 228 N.W. 126 (1930).
27 Harding v. Jesse, 189 Wis. 652, 207 N.W. 706 (1926).
28204 Wis. 332, 235 N.W. 797 (1931).
29 See also Campbell v. Spaeth, Wis. St. Jour., Vol. 15, No. 37, Oct. 14, 1933.
30 Harter v. Dickman, 209 Wis. 289, 245 N.W. 157 (1932) ; reaffirmed in Eisenhut
v. Eisenhut, (upon rehearing) Wis. St. Jour., Vol. 15, No. 37, Oct. 14, 1933.
25
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has violated no duty toward such gratuitous guest.31 Such exception
from liability exists regardless of whether or not the driver was acting
in an emergency;32 in any situation a host cannot be held to exercise
for the protection of his guest "a degree of skill which he is utterly
33
unable to exercise for his own protection.1
Where the driver of an automobile was driving at her usual and
customary rate of speed with which both passengers were perfectly
familiar, such passengers, when they accepted her hospitality to ride
with her to a picnic, accepted whatever risk attended the degree of
proficiency which she had acquired as a driver and her usual and customary habits of driving with which they were familiar. 34 Thus, a
guest, riding with an inexperienced driver, was denied recovery for
injuries sustained when he was thrown out of the car where it appeared
that a rear tire exploded and that the car skidded due to the driver's
suddenly applying the brakes. He was held to have assumed as a matter
of law the risks incident to the host's inexperience and lack of skill
35
in handling a car in such a situation.
A mother, riding with her daughter, in becoming a gratuitous
passenger as she did with a driver who she knew had the very fault,
failing or custom, whichever it may be, which caused the accident, i.e.,
of making turns too fast for safety, must be held to have knowingly
31 "But while it is stated in several opinions of this court that the guest assumes
the risk incident to the degree of skill possessed by the host, this is not the
fundamental ground upon which the exception of a host from liability to a
guest for injury sustained through lack of experience of the host is based.
The fundamental basis of the exemption is that the host has not violated any
duty owed to the guest." Eisenhut v. Eisenhut, supra.
32 Eisenhut v. Eisenhut, supra.; nor can a guest recover for an honest exercise
of judgment in what appears to the driver to be an emergency, for the rule
in an emergency is "one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger and
is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted
to avoid the impending danger is not guilty of negligence if he fails to adopt
what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his
own negligence." Siegl v. Watson, 181 Wis. 619, 195 N.W. 867 (1923); followed in Mellor v. Heggaton, 205 Wis. 42, 236 N.W. 555 (1929).
s Eisenhut v. Eisenhut, supra; citing Cleary v. Eckart, 191 Wis. 114, 210 N.W.
267, 51 A.L.R. 576 (1926).
34 Olson v. Hermansen, 196 Wis. 614, 220 N.W. 203, 61 A.L.R. 243 (1928).
35 Cleary v. Eckart, supra; followed in recent case in which a car was upset by
an inexperienced driver who was attempting to get wheels of automobile back
on concrete where proof showed that driver did "the best he knew how."
Eisenhut v. Eisenhut, (Wis., 1933) 248 N.W. 440. Rule also recognized in
Fontaine v. Fontaine, 205 Wis. 570, 238 N.W. 410 (1931); Ganzer v. Weed,
209 Wis. 135, 244 N.W. 588 (1932) ; Harterv. Dickman, 209 Wis. 289, 245 N.W.
157 (1932).
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assumed such risk."6 Driving with a driver known to be very sleepy
at the time the accident occurred indicates a willingness to assume the
risks involved in such a situation.3 7 Where a driver became nervous
and lost control of the car when it began to sway, such nervousness
due either to his lack of experience or to an exceedingly nervous system, it was held that "the only permissible inference" was that driver
lost control because of his lack of skill and experience, risks assumed
by the passengers in his car."8
NECESSITY OF PROTEST AGAINST RECKLESS CoNDUCT

Although it is recognized that "much advice and many suggestions
to the driver by one sitting in the rear seat are not conducive to the
best management of the car,139 the passenger will be found to have
acquiesced in the negligent operation of an automobile unless he protests against excessive speed, reckless driving, and dangerous practices
indulged in by the driver. 40 Thus, where a group of individuals were
going to a football game, and all of the parties knew of the time
within which the trip to the football game was to be made, they were
held to have assumed the risk of injury which resulted from making
4
the trip in the manner in which it was made. 1
36

Page v. Page, 199 Wis. 641, 227 N.W. 233 (1929).
3 Krueger v. Krueger, 197 Wis. 588, 222 N.W. 784 (1929).
38 Thoas v. Steppert, 200 Wis. 388, 228 N.W. 513 (1930).
39
Brubaker v. Iowa County, 174 Wis. 574, 183 N.W. 690 (1921).
40 Goehnznnn v. National Biscuit Co., 204 Wis. 427, 235 N.W. 792 (1931) ; but
acquiescence in excessive speed for a period of twenty-five seconds is not
contributory negligence, Bryden v. Priem, 190 Wis. 483, 209 N.W. 703 (1926).
See also Royer v. Saecker, 204 Wis. 265, 234 N.W. 742 (1931).
41 Neither driver nor occupant saw warning sign; when defendant reached top
of hill he had to decide whether to run into driveway where there was a
large rock or attempt turn; he attempted turn. "Plaintiff as well as defendant
realized the risk. It is not claimed that any one from time peril was apprehended up to time injuries were sustained could have avoided the result. The
accident was the result of maintaining too high a speed. If the turn had been
successfully negotiated, no one would have thought of complaining of the conduct of the defendant or of charging him with any lack of care or skill.
Because of an unpropitious combination of circumstances injury did result
and it is sought to fasten the responsibility therefor on the host who gratuitously furnished his car for the benefit of the entire party. Despite the finding
of the jury to the contrary, it appears as conclusively as it is possible for it
to appear that the plaintiff assumed the risk of injury which resulted from
making the trip in the manner in which it was made, under the circumstances
of this case. Due to the fact that a hill intervened, the turn was a blind one.
The defendant knew no more about the road than did the plaintiff. * * * Within the rule of Olson v. Hermansen, 196 Wis. 614, 220 N.W. 203, and cases there
cited, it must be held in this case that the plaintiff assumed the risk as a matter of law and a verdict for the defendant should have been directed by the
court." Brockhaus v. Newnan, 201 Wis. 57, 228 N.W. 477 (1930).
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In a case in which the passengers of an automobile offered no protests or uttered no remonstrances against violation of the speed limit
until the car had arrived at a point where collision was inevitable, the
passengers were held to have assumed the risks involved in such operation of the car. The court said, "We fully appreciate the delicate situation of a gratuitous guest when it comes to protesting or remonstrating to the host with respect to illegal speed or with respect to any
other negligence in the operation of a car. However, the law in this
state is now well established * * * that a gratuitous guest cannot idly
sit by, observe clear violations of law, in fact acquiesce in them, and
then, in the event of an accident, hold his host liable for damages. The
privilege of a gratuitous ride is accompanied by a corresponding obli42
gation, and such obligation must be met if liability should ensue."
Thus, "joy riders" driving an automobile at a high speed, "merely for
the purpose of enjoying the exhiliarating and pleasurable sensations
incident to the swirl and dash of rapid transit," assume the risks of
43
danger attendant upon such reckless driving.
It follows from such holdings that one who rides with an intoxicated driver assumes the risk of whatever injuries may be caused
thereby ;44 also, willingness to proceed with a dozing and wearied driver
indicates some assumption of risks involved. 4- Under adverse driving
42

Harding v. Jesse, 189 Wis. 652, 207 N.W. 706 (1926).
Winston's Administrator v. City of Henderson, 179 Ky. 220, 200 S.W. 330
(1918). "Here was a car admittedly plunging through the night on straight
stretches at a rate of forty-seven to sixty miles per hour, the curtains down,
the disturbed atmosphere assuredly rushing like an incipient tornado by the
speeders' ears. * * * With a lighted speedometer directly facing him, acquainted with cars both as passenger and driver, with the car lights covering the
road fifty or seventy-five feet ahead, with the swish of gravel and roar of
the air, can it be said that any human being in possession of his five senses
may be heard to say that at this abandoned rate of speed he possessed his
soul in sweet oblivion and 'didn't notice anything out of the way, the way it
was riding?' For the man in the street, the reasonably prudent citizen whose
legislative representatives have unequivocally banned such wanton driving on
the public highways, plaintiff's plea will fall on deaf ears. If plaintiff did not
know, he should have known, and in law is fixed with knowledge that was
being flashed to him on every side." Dale v. Jaeger,44 Ida. 576, 258 Pac. 1081
(1927). Cited in William W. Hamilton "The Rights and Liabilities of Gratuitous Automobile Passengers," 10 Chicago-Kent Law Rev. 32.
44Biersach v. Wechselberg, 206 Wis. 113, 238 N.W. 905 (1931). It should be
here mentioned that by proceeding on a journey the occupant does not assume
risks of injury caused by negligence of users of the highway other than the
driver unless the acts of such driver in which the guest acquiesced operated
as a cause of the collision. Camieron v. Union Automobile Insurance Co., (Wis.
1933). 246 N.W. 420; explained in Wiese v. Polzer, (Wis., 1933) 248 N.W.
113.
45Kruteger v. Krueger, 197 Wis. 588, 222 N.W. 784 (1929).
43
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conditions it is probable that a willingness to proceed at all would entail
an assumption of whatever risks are attributable to such adverse driving conditions. In a recent case a woman riding on the front seat of
an automobile driven by her husband sought recovery for injuries incurred when her husband's automobile collided with another machine.
Testimony showed that the weather conditions were adverse, there
being a very heavy fog which rendered headlights useless. Upon appeal
a lower court judgment for the plaintiff was reversed with directions
to dismiss the complaint. The court found that there was complete assumption of risk. "The plaintiff was riding in the front seat with her
husband. She was fully aware of the foggy condition, commented upon
it, and clearly must have known of the dangers and hazards incident to
traveling under such conditions. At times the fog was so bad that the
lights of an approaching car could be seen for a distance of 6nly thirty
feet; yet through this fog she and her husband continued to travel
without protest on her part and without coercion by her husband."
Upon this set of facts the court felt impelled to remark. "May it
be said with reason and common sense that a person may ride in a
car for many miles under such conditions without fully assuming the
risk of injury incident to such a trip? We think not. The plaintiff knew
that the fog was so bad that it was possible to see only a few feet
ahead. She deemed it necessary to watch the right edge of the concrete
in order to assist her husband in keeping the car on his side of the
road and prevent its going into the ditch. She knew how difficult it
was for her to see objects for any distance ahead, and, consequently,
knew how difficult it was for her husband to see. Though we have
not heretofore had a case before us in which the facts were substantially similar, we feel impelled to hold under the well-established rules
applicable to assumption of risk by an occupant of an automobile, that
the plaintiff assumed the risk, and, in justice, should not be permitted
to recover damages from her husband. ' 46 The Knipfer case is important
in that it lists, in fairly objective form, the elements necessary to assumption of risk; these are (1) hazard or danger inconsistent with
the safety of the guest; (2) knowledge and appreciation of the hazard
by the guest; (3) acquiescence or willingness to proceed in the face of
the danger.
46Knipfer v. Shaw, (Wis., 1933) 246 N.W. 328. See also Howe v. Corey, 172
Wis. 537, 179 N.W. 791 (1920) ; in this case defendant drove automobile with
"frosted" windshield due to zero weather and with automobile lights that were
in poor condition; car was operated at a reckless rate of speed and collided
with train; plaintiff testified that he mentioned to driver that speed at which
they were proceeding was pretty fast, but admitted he was keeping no lookout. Court held plaintiff acquiesced in the operation of the car and assumed

the hazards and dangers incident thereto.
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However, the "assumption of risk" standard laid down in the
Knipfer case does not bar such defense where the negligence of the
driver is of momentary character, even though there is no opportunity
for passenger acquiescence or passenger protest against such momentary negligence. Thus, in a very recent case, where the driver of the
car involved, driving at a rapid rate of speed and while passing another
vehicle on the right hand side of such vehicle, suddenly swerved to
avoid hitting a truck which loomed up in front of him, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court held that such swerving even if it were considered to
be negligence "cannot be separated from his negligence in getting into
the situation and as to this the plaintiff assumed the risk."4 The Court
remarks that the reasonable rule compels the guest to accept the host
with all his infirmities of skill and judgment. 4s
"BACK

SEAT DRIVING"

The foregoing commentary on the necessity of passenger protest
against excessive speed and reckless driving should not be interpreted
as indicating that the Wisconsin Supreme Court has judicially sanctioned "back seat driving." As a matter of fact such persistent suggestions as to the immediate operation of the car have been held to be
"an abominable practice. '49 It would seem that circumstances might
47

Young v. Nunn-Bush Co., et al.,
(Wis., 1933) 249 N.W. 278. The Court reaffirmed the rule that "** * the guest must take the host with his defects of
skill and judgment and known habits and eccentricities and in addition the
guest is considered to acquiesce in any course of driving that has persisted
long enough to give him an opportunity to protest and thus indicate his dissent or disapproval of the manner of driving," and also held, "If the host
proceeds at a negligent rate of speed which the guest assumes and by reason
of this speed finds himself in a situation requiring instant decision and giving

him opportunity for further negligence with respect to control it is impossible
to isolate the subsequent negligence from the prior negligence and to hold in
spite of the fact that the guest has acquiesced in the former that the momentary character of the latter makes acquiescence impossible."
48 See Harter v. Dickman, 209 Wis. 289, 245 N.W. 157 (1932), where the court
remarks, "If in a given case it appears that observations have been made and
that a host has exercised his judgment as to the operation of his automobile
but has not in fact exercised the best judgment, as a result of which injury
results to a guest, the latter in such a situation, should not be permitted to
recover, because the host has exercised such skill as he possesses and has
exercised such judgment as he is capable of exercising."
49
"We do not consider that the law casts upon the occupants of a car any duty
with reference to the manner in which the car is momentarily managed by the
driver. Not only does it not cast any duty upon them in such respect, but it
should not recognize any prerogative on their part. 'Driving from the back
seat' should not be encouraged when it comes to the details of car management in emergencies. The practice is not indulged in by considerate persons,
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arise which would make it difficult to determine whether a suggestion
as to the management of an automobile constituted "back seat driving"
or a necessary protest against reckless operation of the car. The court's
viewpoint seems to be that interference in the momentary management
of the vehicle is objectionable, but complaints on less temporary matters,
such as general rate of speed and general driving habits, and hazardous
driving conditions are to be encouraged.50
And while it has been decided that a passenger cannot remain as
indifferent to the operation of an automobile as if he had been but a
disinterested bystander, 51 the courts seem to refuse to define exactly
what degree of protestation will relieve such passenger from assumption of risk. 2 Even a protest may be insufficient, if it is not
heeded ;53 negligence may be predicated upon unreasonably remaining
in the machine, or not insisting upon leaving the machine, where
and, if it were, the harm would exceed the good. The momentary management of the car should be left to the driver. He understands his car and
appreciates the control he has over it, and what he can do with it, better
than does the passenger. Continual suggestions are but confusing and irritating and we think it better that it be definitely understood that neither duty
devolves upon, nor prerogatives belong to the occupants of a car to participate
in its immediate management and control. They have a duty to warn, and a
duty to protest against excessive speed and reckless conduct. These, however,
are all apart from the immediate management of the car and especially in
emergencies." Goehann v. National Biscuit Co., supra; see also Brubaker v.
Iowa County, supra.
50 As a matter of law there is not contributory negligence where passenger did
not know exactly the form of turn driver intended to make and where the
turn onto the crossing in the manner in which it was effected was rather sudden and plaintiff had no control over the car. Vogel v. Otto, 182 Wis. 1, 195
N.W. 859 (1923). Nor where driver suddenly turned car into ditch. Krantz v.
Krantz, (Wis., 1933) 248 N.W. 156.
51 Wobosel v. Lee, 209 Wis. 51, 243 N.W. 425 (1932).
52 "No case has been found, however, which attempts to define the amount of
protestation necessary to relieve the guest of contributory negligence as a
matter of law. When it is considered that the guest has no control over the
automobile and that it is not within his or her power to coerce the driver, it
is apparent that all the guest may do is to indicate to the host his or her
displeasure wih reference to the manner in which the car is being driven.
Under such circumstances the considerate host will respect the feelings of
his guest and modify his rate of speed or other reckless conduct, to conform
to the pleasure of his guest. Should the host persist in his reckless driving,
the guest may ask to be let out of the car, but that he should do so under
all circumstances has never been held his duty as a matter of law, so far as
we are advised. Here the plaintiff did protest not once but several times. She
did not ask to be let out of the car, and it was for the jury to say whether her
failure in this respect constituted a want of ordinary care on her part." Krause
v. Hall, 195 Wis. 565, 217 N.W. 290 (1928).
5 Sheehan v. Coffey, 205 App. Div. 388, 200 N.Y. S.55 (1923).
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passenger is aware of the excessive speed and reckless driving.54 To a
considerable extent each case rests upon its own peculiar circumstances; and to some extent generalizations may be misleading; there-fore, it is probable that the most one can conclude is that the passenger
must conduct himself as a reasonably prudent person would under the
circumstances.
ADVISABILITY OF ADOPTING A "RECKLESS

OPERATION"

STATUTE

IN WISCONSIN

Within the last few years the legislatures of several of the states
where the prevailing rule of ordinary care applies have, by legislative
enactment, considerably limited the liability of the driver of the automobile. 55 Such statutory changes are undoubtedly actuated by a realization of the harshness of a rule that requires the driver to exercise more
care to protect his gratuitous guest than to protect his own life,56 and
by an understanding of the injustice involved in permitting a guest to
accept the hospitality of his host in enjoying the automobile and then
54
55

Krause v. Southern Mich. R. Co., 215 Mich. 139, 183 N.W. 768 (1921).
Calif., Gen. Laws, sec. 141.75; Colo., Sess. Laws (1931) c. 118; Conn., Gen.
Stat. (Rev. 1930) sec. 1628; Del., Laws (1929) c. 270; Idaho, Sess. Laws (1931) ;
c. 135; Ill., Laws (1931) p. 779; Indiana, Laws (1929) c. 201; Iowa, Code
(1931) No. 5026-bi; Kansas, Laws (1931) c. 81; Maryland, Laws (1931) c.
391 (vetoed) ; Michigan, Comp. Laws (1929) sec. 4648; Montana, Laws (1931)
c. 195; Nebraska, Laws (1931) c. 105; North Dakota, Laws (1931) c. 184;
Oregon, Laws (1929) c. 401; Texas, Gen. Laws (1931) c. 225; Vermont, Public Acts (1929) No. 78; Wyoming, Rev. Statutes (1931) sec. 72-701. The pertinent terms in these statutes describing the conduct for which the driver
becomes liable to his gratuitous guest are as follows: Calif., "intoxication,
willful misconduct, or gross negligence;" Colorado, "intentional * * * intoxication * * * or * * * negligence consisting of a willful and wanton disregard
of the rights of others;" Conn., "intentional * * * or caused by his heedlessness or his reckless disregard of the rights of others;" Idaho, "intent * * *
gross negligence or his reckless disregard of the rights of others ;" Ill., "willful or wanton misconduct;" Indiana, "intent * * * or caused by his reckless
disregard of the rights of others;" Iowa, intoxication or "reckless operation;"
Kansas, "gross and wanton negligence," Maryland, "gross negligence;" Mich.,

"gross negligence or his wilful or wanton misconduct;" Montana, "grossly
negligent and reckless operation;" North Dakota, "intoxication, willful misconduct or gross negligence;" Oregon, "intentional or caused by his gross
negligence or intoxication or his reckless disregard of the rights of others;"
Texas, "intent * * * or caused by his heedlessness or reckless disregard for
the rights of others;" Vermont, gross or willful negligence; Wyoming, "gross
negligence or willful and wanton misconduct." (This summary of so-called
"guest statutes" taken from Note, "The Liability of the Driver of an Automobile to his Gratuitous Guest," 18 Iowa Law Rev. 78 [19323.)
56Minor Brounaugh, "Liability of Owner for Injury to Guest of Servant or
Borrower of Car," Law Notes, April, 1928, p. 7.
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upon being injured while riding with him, to retaliate by suing his
host for damages.5 7 Legislatures have probably also been cognizant of
the fact that a great deal of the litigation between guest and host is
prompted solely by the fact that the latter has carried liability insurance, and the insurance company is the real defendant ;"" such actions
are likely to be collusive in character, often being mere meritless attempts to recover damages from a member of the immediate family
of the injured person.
It is apparent that by the adoption of such "gross negligence" or
"guest" statutes the legislatures of these various states are as a practical proposition adopting the minority rule as to the liability of automobile driver to automobile passenger, 59 and hold the driver liable only
for gross negligence. 60 Such statutes, at least if they do not entirely
abolish all liability on the part of a driver, are clearly constitutional;
it has been held that such statutes do not violate the "due process of
law" or "equal protection of the law" clauses of state or federal constitutions.61 Such statutes, properly worded, 62 hold the driver of a
57 "The reason for the minority rule is that when one asks or accepts the hospi-

t:,lity of another he takes upon himself the risk of such injury as may resulf
from that casual or ordinary negligence which even careful drivers sometimes
display." Frank Mechem & Lowl P. Mickelwait, "Gross Negligence," 5 Wash.
Law Rev., 91,104 (1930).
58 "Counsel for defendant may be right in his attitude that the numerous cases
now arising wherein a guest in an automobile, frequently closely related to
the driver, sues him for damages because of his alleged negligence but more
because of his insurance call for some new law. It may be that as a practical
matter the most important fact in the case is that the defendant is insured."
Truso v. Ehnert, 177 Minn. 249, 225 N.W. 98 (1929). Similar situation discussed in Fontaine v. Fontaine, 205 Wis. 570, 238 N.W. 410 (1931). "The record shows that this is an action by the wife against her husband. It also shows
that the husband is not averse to recovery by the wife. The testimony given
by both husband and wife upon the trial does not conform to written statements made by them to the insurance company prior to the trial, etc."
59 The minority rule is that the owner of an automobile is liable to his guest
for gross negligence only. See Massaletti v. Fitzroy, 228 Mass. 487, 118 N.E.
168 (1917) ; Cook v. Cole, 273 Mass. 537, 174 N.E. 271 (1931) ; Carpenter v.
Thomas, 164 Wash. 583, 3 P. (2d) 1001 (1931); McDonald v. Balletti, 164
Wash. 595, 4 P. (2d) 506 (1931); Engle v. Finch, 37 Ga. App. 389, 140 S.E.
632 (1927).
60 "It is apparent from a review of the authorities that by the adoption of the
guest statutes, the several states in so doing have in fact adopted the minority
rule of no recovery without gross negligence." Hon. Sumner Kenner, "Statutes Regulating Liability of Owner or Operator of an Automobile for Injury
to a Guest," 19 Amer. Bar Ass'n. Jour. 231 (1933).
61
Nauditis v. Lahr, 253 Mich. 216, 234 N.W. 581 (1931) ; Silver v. Silver, 108
Conn. 371, 143 Atl. 240 (1928), aff'd. in 280 U.S. 117, 50 Sup. Ct. 57, 74 L. Ed.
221 (1929).
62
"It is submitted that the view adopted by the Iowa, Michigan, and Connecticut
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motor vehicle liable only for reckless operation, meaning by recklessness something more than mere negligence, implying "no care, coupled
with disregard for the consequences." 6
CONCLUSION

It is evident from the foregoing that the development of the law
in Wisconsin covering the liability of automobile drivers to gratuitous
passengers has had an interesting history. For fifty years prior to 1921
the guest could not recover against the host because of the doctrine of
imputed negligence. The abandonment of that rule of law immediately
gave rise to a mass of litigation. Wife sued husband. Father sued son.
Sweethearts upon the threshold of marriage became adverse litigants
in the courts.
From a moral and ethical point of view this mass of litigation
was not inspired by any desire to find fault with the driver, nor by a
desire to add insult to injury by demanding money damages from the
host; but basically this litigation was a means to the end that the insurer
,of the host should pay for the host's negligence. We feel that this
-underlying attitude was controlling in the rapid development of the
host-guest law since 1921 which placed constantly increasing limitations on the right of the guest to recover from his host until today
we could again cite as the prevailing rule that portion of the decision
of Mr. Chief Justice Ryan in Prideau v. City of Mineral Point to the
effect that "One voluntarily in a private conveyance voluntarily trusts
his personal safety in the conveyance to the person in control of it.
Voluntary entrance into a private conveyance adopts the conveyance
for the time being as one's own, and assumes the risk of the skill and
,care of the person guiding it."
As the law stands today, each case rests and must be decided on
its own facts. While the duty of the guest for his own safety and
the obligation of the host has from time to time been defined, there
is no certainty in the law. The court itself is helpless in this situation.
As the judicial branch of the government its duty is to administer
justice on the facts of each case by the application of rules of law.
courts is preferable. That view, briefly stated, removes all liability except for
misconduct manifesting willfulness or evincing a reckless disregard for the
rights of others * * * to include negligence, though of a high degree, makes
it extremely doubtful whether the statute would accomplish any change at all
particularly in states where degrees of negligence are not recognized. * * *

It would seem better to design the conduct for which the statute seeks to
impose liability as "recklessness," reckless operation, or reckless disregard for
the rights of others." Note, "The Liability of the Driver of an Automobile to

His Gratuitous Guest," supra.
v. Puth, 211 Iowa 775, 239 N.W. 46 (1931).
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Much can be said however in favor of legislative action already
taken in at least fifteen states which has defined the duty of the host
to his guest in line with the moral, ethical, and social understanding
of the host-guest relationship. These statutes generally limit the host's
liability to cases of gross negligence. Consequently they put at rest
a great deal of litigation. They are real measures of economy in the
cost of maintaining the judiciary. They are also a wholesome social
influence in maintaining and encouraging a generous and altruistic
relationship between those blessed with an automobile and those who
cannot afford to own one. The subject recommends itself to legislative
consideration.

